A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES OF SUN TZU AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ-Brig Gen Rajendra Chhetri
War is a grave concern of the state; it must be thoroughly studied.
– Sun TzuWar is the application of armed forces by a state to destroy the enemy army to compel
another state to follow the attacker’s will. – Carl von Clausewitz
Various theorists have proffered their military strategies throughout history. Among many such theorists, the works of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz are widely referred to. Their insights have
even been incorporated into national military doctrine and strategy. These two famous strategists
wrote in different eras, and their respective products are infl uenced by the nature of warfare and
strategic environment of their times. In The Art of War1, Sun Tzu analyzes war from an idealistic point
of view. But in On War2, Clausewitz discusses war from a philosophical point of view; he shows that
war is very enigmatic and susceptible to chance and happenstance. These great strategists exhibit
many common views in their theories; however, they also reveal sharp differences in several aspects
of their deliberation on war. This paper analyzes the work of these two strategists and compares the
main ideas of their theories of strategy and war.
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, was composed around the fi fth century BC. Sun Tzu was greatly
infl uenced by the ancient Chinese war strategies. The contents of his book indicate that he had
considerable practical experience of war. Although this book was written during the period when
there was no development of any sophisticated weapons and equipment, nevertheless, he offers a
comprehensive, thoughtful product that has been studied and implemented not only during the confl icts
of the Chinese dynastic eras, but also in modern contemporary periods. His theories have signifi cantly
infl uenced Chinese and Japanese military thoughts throughout history. His theory achieved enormous
popularity in its applications during the warfare of 19th and 20th centuries. Mao Tse-Tung’s strategic
vision, that brought revolutionary change to modern China, is also heavily inspired by the Sun Tzu’s
theories, which have even been adopted in Chinese military strategy. Although some scholars have
questioned Sun Tzu’s actual existence, however, historians have found enough evidence to prove his
existence and certainly his The Art of War is a living document3.
Clausewitz’s On War
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War was published in 1832 by his wife, a year after his death4.
Clausewitz was a career army offi cer, who served in active duty during the Revolutionary War and
Napoleonic War between 1792 and 1815.5 Clausewitz’s strategies are heavily infl uenced by the
war strategy of Napoleon. Clausewitz believed in the Napoleonic concept of victory through battle
and destruction of the opposing forces, at any cost. His book, though written long after Sun Tzu’s
book, was also written at the time when military technology was not very advanced. Nonetheless, his
theories remain relevant even in today’s hi-tech era. It is said that he couldn’t complete his writing
as he projected. However, during the process of redrafting his original work, he generated another
idea, that of war as a “remarkable trinity”, in which the directing policy of government, the professional
qualities of the army, and the attitude of the population all played an equally signifi cant part.6
Comparative Analysis
The theories of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz both primarily focus on the strategies, conduct,
and effects of war. This paper will compare and analyze some of the key aspects of their theories;
particularly, their views on war, relation of war with politics, impact of intelligence, effects of surprise
and deception, and destruction of enemy. Sun Tzu argued that war had specifi c characteristics and
could be waged to achieve predictable outcomes. Sun Tzu’s thoughts are basically derived from the
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ancient Chinese war strategies. Clausewitz, on the other hand, participated with the Prussian army
in many campaigns during revolutionary wars and Napoleonic wars. He derives his theory from his
actual experience of wars and experiences of teaching.
These two strategists have own way of describing war. Wars in Sun Tzu’s time in ancient
China were conducted in accordance with accepted norms and codes primarily for the purpose of
territorial expansion. Sun Tzu thus claims that, “War is a grave concern of the state; it must be
thoroughly studied.7 Sun Tzu believes that, “the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were
decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success.”8 He
specifi es that success is guaranteed if requirements are met. According to Sun Tzu, the war should
be waged with minimal fi ghting, in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in lives and
efforts, and with infl icting the fewest possible casualties on the enemy,9 ideally war could be avoided
through a series of strategic, political, and non-military activities. Sun Tzu’s advocacy of a minimal
use of force is applicable these days in counter insurgency operations, in which, the capture and
possible conversion of insurgents is preferable than to killing them. Sun Tzu favors effi cient war over
Clausewitz’s total war. Sun Tzu’s theory signifi cantly differs with Clausewitz, who advocates in total
destruction of enemy forces. Clausewitz defi nes war as, “an act of force to compel our enemy to do
our will.”10 According to Clausewitz, war should be fought with maximum use of force with the aim of
disarming the enemy to render him incapable of further resistance. Clausewitz, however, believes
that the outcomes of war are never fi nal; he points out that “the defeated state often considers the
outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at
some later date”.11
We can fi nd similarity of the views of these two strategists on their thoughts of relation of
war to politics. Both realize that war is a political action of the state with a political purpose. Sun
Tzu indicates that war is the ultimate instrument of statecraft; it should be used only when other
instruments have failed. Sun Tzu, thus, believes that war is a tool of the state, but he regards the
conduct of war as an art. Clausewitz’s famous statement also concurs with Sun Tzu’s views; “War is
not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried
on with other means…the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can
never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”12 As in politics, the outcome is not always certain;
Clausewitz claims an enshrouding “fog” always conceals the exact characteristics of a wartime situation.
This element of uncertainty is a key highlight in Clausewitz’s philosophy; he believes strongly that war is
in large part determined by chance and probability. He claims that the nature of war makes it inherently
unpredictable. Clausewitz is in conformity with Sun Tzu that almost in all cases, war is waged as a last
resort to achieve a political objective. It is a common view of these strategists that, when the political goals
are achieved, there is a strong possibility that peace will prevail. But, on most occasions, Clausewitz,
admits, results are not always fi nal. Recent examples of Arab-Israeli confl icts and the India- Pakistan wars
reveal serial engagements interrupted by truce. But, tensions persist and root causes of the confl icts are
unresolved. The political objectives of all parties have yet to be achieved. These countries used war was
as a tool (Sun Tzu’s term) or other means (Clausewitz’s term) to achieve perhaps unattainable political
objectives. Therefore, views of both strategists are relevant that total victory in war is not possible
unless the political objectives are achieved.
Intelligence can play a crucial role in war. Both strategists emphasize the importance of
intelligence in war. Sun Tzu’s famously declared, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred
battle you will never be in peril.”13 There is no question about Sun Tzu’s estimation of the value
of intelligence. But, Clausewitz views intelligence from different perspectives although he also
acknowledges importance of intelligence. According to him, contradictory, false, and uncertain
intelligence simply complicates the conduct of war. Only reliable intelligence, synthesized through
an effective process based on sound knowledge, analysis, and judgment can be useful to the
commanders. So, Clausewitz offers a much more qualifi ed view of intelligence than Sun Tzu does.
Nonetheless, both agree that, whether it is high intensity war or low intensity confl icts, absence of
timely and accurate intelligence will have signifi cant impact on the result of war.
Deception is considered as an effective “force multiplier” and key element for success even in
today’s warfare. While comparing the work of these two great strategists, it is relevant to review what
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they have to say with regard to deception and surprise. Sun Tzu assigns the utmost importance to
deception, which he advises must be fully exploited.14 He thinks that deception must be used at all
times of war. An army must never let the enemy know the truth. An army should use spies to disrupt
an enemy’s plans and create subversion within the ranks. Attacking the enemy without actually
fi ghting should be the aim of an army. Espionage should be employed to gather information about the
enemy, to create havoc within the ranks of the enemy’s army, to break up the enemy’s alliances, and
to generally isolate and demoralize the enemy. Sun Tzu believes that espionage is a powerful tool
in war; moreover, he advises that the overall practice of deception is incredibly infl uential in a war.15
Clausewitz, on the other hand, emphasizes surprise in both offensive and defensive operations. He
believes that surprise provides an excellent means to gain superiority. Because of its psychological
effects, it should also be considered as an independent element. He advocates that surprise should be
fundamentally incorporated into all operations without exception in widely varying degrees, depending
on the nature and circumstances of the operation.”16 Clausewitz believes that the defenders will have
better opportunity to give surprise and deception as opposed to attackers.
Sun Tzu’s idea of offensive strategy is different than Clausewitz’s idea. Sun Tzu advocates
capturing the enemy rather than destroying it. He suggests that, “… To subdue the enemy without
fi ghting is the acme of skill … what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy
… next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army … those skilled in war
subdue the enemy’s army without battle …”17 Whilst, Clausewitz advocates destruction of enemy
forces as the means to the end. According to him, “the engagement is the only means of destroying
the enemy forces.”18 Recent example of offensive operations and success made by the Sri Lankan
government against the Tamil insurgents validates the Clausewitz’s theory as Sri Lankan government
could crush the Tamil insurgency by using the means and ways of total destruction.
These strategists have dissimilar views on victory and destruction of the enemy. Sun Tzu
minimizes the value of total destruction of enemy. According to him, offensive strategy is greatly
determined by the relative strength of one’s own army and the enemy’s army. He advocates awaiting
for a very favorable force ratio before launching an attack on the enemy.19 Clausewitz, on the other
hand, argues military forces of the enemy are often the center of gravity, so total destruction of the
enemy forces will lead to ultimate victory in war. Clausewitz believes that victory must be absolute;
the enemy must be completely beaten to the point that retaliation is not possible. Even when a
country cannot win the war, it should at least try to do as much damage as possible to its enemy. Sun
Tzu also believes that, “victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted
and morale depressed… When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state
will not suffi ce… Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations”.20 The American
experience in Vietnam, Soviet experience in Afghanistan in ‘80s, and growing negative public opinion
about prolonged involvement in Iraq are some of the examples that validates Sun Tzu’s theory of
repercussion for not having swift victory.
Conclusion
To summarize, both theorists are primarily infl uenced by their times. What is most notable
and important is that their theories are still applicable. They are often quoted and their theories
are used as a reference in military schools of most countries. While both of these strategists have
different perspectives on viewing the essence of war, they do agree on strategic issues. They both
agree that war be conducted in a short, concentrated effort, but in slightly different ways. Sun Tzu
offers a very idealistic, rational view of war. He believes victory is assured if requirements have
been met. Clausewitz, on the other hand, sees war as an uncertain, foggy event. Both realize that a
strong leader is necessary for victory. Sun Tzu predicts that victory is possible if the generals are not
interfered with by the sovereign.21 Sun Tzu views war as a small-scale operation, while Clausewitz
believes that it is an all-encompassing act which requires the wholesale efforts of an entire nation.
Sun Tzu advocates the use of deception, while Clausewitz warns us to be suspicious of the enemy
in all respects. It is their differences that make the two military strategists so remarkable. Ultimately,
it is their views on chance that distinguish one from the other. No matter whatever the similarity and
dissimilarity that they have in their respective theories, their work is remarkable and immortal and
relevant and recognized even in today’s hi-tech era.
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End Notes
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel B. Griffi th, Oxford University Press, The Chinese Strategists, Sun Tzu
wrote his theory around 5th century BC.
2 Carl von Clausewitz, “On War”, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press,
New Jersey,
3 Sun Tzu, pp 1. Sun Tzu writes, …The fi rst to doubt the reliability…Sun Wu never existed and that “The Art of War”
ascribed to him was “probably a fabrication of disputatious sophists” of the Warring States …
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, pp.1-12, Detail accounts of Sun Tzu’s existence is given in these pages.
4 Clausewitz, “On War”, pp. 27.
5 Michael Howard, “CLAUSEWITZ A Very Short Introduction” Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 5.
6 Ibid., pp.21. Clausewitz could complete six of eight projected books.
7 Sun Tzu, pp. 39 Sun Tzu further writes, “Here is recognition – and for the fi rst time – that armed strife is not a transitory
aberration but a recurrent conscious act and therefore susceptible to rational analysis”.
8 Ibid., pp. 39.
9 Ibid., pp. 39.
10 Clausewitz, pp.75
11 Ibid., pp. 80.
12 Ibid.. pp. 87.
13 Sun Tzu, pp. 84. This is his famous quote and referred often. He further writes: “… when you are ignorant of the enemy
but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are
certain in every battle to be in peril”.
14 Ibid., pp. 41, 106 – 110.
15 Ibid., pp. 144-149.
16 On war pp. 198
17 Sun Tzu, pp. 77 – 84.
18 Clausewitz, pp. 529.
19 Sun Tzu, pp. 78-81. Sun Tzu writes, ”in war the best policy is to take a state intact …to capture enemy’s army is better
than to destroy it …to subdue the enemy without fi ghting is the acme of skill …supreme importance in war is to attack the
enemy’s strategy …next best is to disrupt his alliances … next best is to attack his army …worst policy is to attack cities.
Attack cities when there is no alternative.”
20 Sun Tzu, pp.73.
21 Sun Tzu, pp. 82-85. Sun Tzu presented fi ve circumstances in which victory may be predicted: a) He who knows when
he can fi ght and when he cannot will be victorious, b) He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be
victorious. c) He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. d) He who prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who
is not, will be victorious. e) He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.
